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Judicial Review of Commerce Department
Antidumping Duty Determinations:
Deference or Abdication?
Kevin C. Kennedy*
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979' and the Customs Courts
Act of 19802 effected a sweeping overhaul of U.S. law governing in-
ternational trade.3 Among the many procedural changes triggered
by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (the Act or TAA) was the
transfer of responsibility for conducting countervailing and an-
tidumping duty investigations from the Treasury Department to the
Commerce Department. 4 In addition, the TAA was the prime moti-
vating force for enactment of the Customs Courts Act of 1980. 5 The
Customs Courts Act, in tandem with the TAA,6 revamped wholesale
the judicial review procedures governing international trade mat-
ters. 7 For example, an expanded number of "interested parties"
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. J.D. 1977,
Wayne State University Law School; LL.M. 1982, Harvard Law School. The author was
responsible for international trade litigation as a trial attorney with the Civil Division of
the U.S. Department of Justice.
I Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at scattered sections of titles 5, 7.
13, 19, 26, 28, 31 U.S.C.).
2 Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1771 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of titles 5,
16, 19, 26, 28 U.S.C.).
3 See Symposium: A Practitioner's Guide to International Trade Law, 6 N.CJ. IN'L L. &
Com. REG. 307 (1981); Barringer & Dunn, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties Investgations
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 14 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1 (1979).
4 See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1982); Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273
(1979); Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980). See also S. REP. No. 249, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1979) (noting the "dismal performance" of the Treasury Depart-
ment in assessing dumping duties).
5 See H.R. REP. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3731. "H.R. 7540 complements Title X of the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, which provided for judicial review of certain types of agency determinations prin-
cipally relating to antidumping and countervailing duty determinations." Id.
6 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982).
7 See H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 5, at 27-28.
8 An "interested party" is defined in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA or the
Act) as (1) a foreign manufacturer, producer, or importer of the merchandise under inves-
tigation; (2) the government of a country in which such merchandise is manufactured; (3) a
domestic manufacturer of a product like the one under investigation; (4) a union repre-
senting workers in an industry engaged in the manufacture of such a product; and (5) a
trade association a majority of whose members manufactures such a product. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1677(9) (1982).
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were for the first time given access to the U.S. Court of International
Trade9 as well as to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC" or "Federal Circuit"). 10
This article critiques three Federal Circuit decisions" in which
Commerce Department interpretations of the TAA's antidumping
duty provisions were reviewed and concludes that the degree to
which the Federal Circuit deferred to Commerce Department statu-
tory interpretations has been excessive, tantamount to abdication of
the judicial review function.
To better understand the significance of these decisions, a brief
discussion of the antidumping duty law, the antidumping administra-
tive process, and the scope of judicial review of this process is
necessary.
I. Overview of the Antidumping Duty Law and
the Scope of Judicial Review
With the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, respon-
sibility for the administration of the antidumping duty (AD) law was
transferred to the Commerce Department.' 2 Commerce, acting
through its International Trade Administration (ITA), is the "ad-
ministering authority"' 3 for the TAA. The raison d'etre of the AD
law is to prevent price discrimination within national markets. 14 To
effectuate this goal, U.S. businesses may file petitions with the ITA
when it appears that a competing foreign manufacturer or producer
is importing merchandise into the United States at prices which are
less than fair value. 15 If the ITA finds that foreign merchandise is
being sold or may be sold in the United States at less than fair value,
it will impose an additional antidumping duty subject to review by
the U.S. International Trade Commission. 16
The ITA calculates antidumping duties by determining the
amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States
price for the merchandise, and thus the fair value of the imported
9 Id. § 1516a (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982).
10 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c), (e) (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982). See generally Note.
Judicial Review of Antidumping Cases and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: Towards a Unified
System of Review, 14J. INT'L L. & ECON. 101 (1979).
11 Consumer Prods. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., Inc., 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); Melamine Chems., Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Smith-
Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1274
(1984).
12 See supra note 4.
Is 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1982).
14 Barshefsky & Cunningham, The Prosecution of Antidumping Actions Under the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307, 308 (1981).
15 See 19 U.S.C. H9 1673-1673a (1982). See also Barshefsky & Cunningham, supra note
14, at 318-30; Barcelo, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round,
13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257 (1980).
16 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
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goods. 17 Although "fair value" is not defined in the Act,18 Congress
intended the concept of fair value to be an estimate of foreign mar-
ket value.' 9 "Foreign market value" is defined as the home market
price for the merchandise under investigation 20 or, in the absence of
home market sales, third country prices. 2' "Home market price,"
the most commonly used measure of foreign market value, generally
represents the wholesale price of imported merchandise in the for-
eign manufacturer's home market.22 U.S. price, in turn, is the U.S.
sales price of the merchandise, computed by one of two alternative
methods: purchase price 23 or exporter's sale price. 24 The relation-
ship between the importer and foreign manufacturer determines
which of these methods will be used. If the merchandise is sold to an
unrelated importer in the United States, the "purchase price"
formula is used.25 If, on the other hand, the sale is to a related im-
porter, the "exporter's sales price" is employed. 28
Through the use of certain price adjustments, a constructed
value based on an arm's length transaction is derived. 27 If foreign
market value exceeds U.S. price for the merchandise in question af-
ter adjustment, an antidumping duty equal to that excess may be im-
17 Id.
18 H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979). "The term fair value is not
defined in current law nor in the bill." Id.
19 Id.
20 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(A) (1982).
21 Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (1982). See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 4, at 94-96.
22 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)(A) (1982).
23 Id. § 1677a(b).
24 Id. § 1677a(c); see id § 1677(13). See also S. REP. No. 249, supra note 4, at 93-94.
25 S. REP. No. 249, supra note 4, at 94.
26 As explained by the Federal Circuit in Smith-Corona Group v. United States:
United States price, as defined in section 1677a, is computed by one of
two methods: purchase price or exporter's sales price. The antidumping law
attempts to construct value on the basis of arm's length transactions. The
arm's length sale takes place at different points in the chain of commerce
depending on whether the goods traveled through a related importer or
through an independent, unrelated importer. Thus, different methods of
computation of United States price are required depending on the relation-
ship of the importer to the foreign producer.
Where the importer is an unrelated, independent party, purchase price
is used. Purchase price is the actual agreed-to price between the foreign pro-
ducer and the independent importer, prior to the time of importation.
Where the importer is related, an arm's length transaction does not occur
until the goods are resold to a retailer or to the public. In that case, "ex-
porter's sales price" is used. Exporter's sales price is the price at which the
roods are eventually transferred in an arm's length transaction, whether
fom the importer to an independent retailer or directly to the public.
Both purchase price and exporter's sales price are subject to adjustment
in order to derive a "fair" United States price for comparison with foreign
market value. The adjustments provided in section 1677a(d) are applicable
to both purchase price and exporter's sales price. The additional adjust-
ments provided in section 1677a(e) are applicable on/y to exporter's sales
price.
713 F.2d 1568, 1572 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
27 Id.
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posed.28 The U.S. International Trade Commission ultimately
determines whether antidumping duties will be imposed. The Com-
mission is authorized to impose duties only if it finds that the peti-
tioning industry is being injured by reason of the less-than-fair-value
imports. 29 If the Commission either preliminarily ° or finally3l de-
termines that domestic industry is not suffering injury by reason of
contested imports, or if the ITA concludes that competing merchan-
dise imports are not being sold in the United States at less than fair
value,32 the case is closed at the administrative level. If, however,
both the ITA and the Commission reach final affirmative determina-
tions, antidumping duties are imposed on the offending merchandise
in an amount equal to the dumping margin calculated by the ITA.33
Affirmative AD determinations are regularly reviewed by the ITA34
and may eventually be revoked if the ITA is satisfied that dumping
has ceased.35
Judicial review of ITA administrative determinations is expressly
provided for in the TAA.36 Petitioning U.S. manufacturers, import-
ers and foreign manufacturers of the subject merchandise who have
participated in the administrative proceedings may contest either the
ITA's or the Commission's findings and conclusions3 7 by filing a
summons and complaint with the Court of International Trade
("CIT").38 The Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over all antidumping actions.39 Subsequently, an appeal of right
may be taken to the Federal Circuit from an adverse CIT decision.40
The scope of judicial review of final AD determinations is statu-
torily defined to be whether the determination is "unsupported by
substantial evidence of the record, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." 4 1 It is this latter standard-"or otherwise not in accord-
ance with law"-and its application by the Federal Circuit which this
article will examine.
28 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
29 Id.; see Note, Injury Determinations Under the United States Antidumping Laws Before and
After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTGERs L. REV. 1076, 1096 (1981); Note, An
Analysis of "Material Injury" Under the 1979 Trade Agreements Act, 4 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
LJ. 87, 90 (1981).
30 19 U.S.C. § 1673b (1982).
31 Id. § 1673d(c)(2) (1982).
32 Id.
33 Id. §§ 1673d(c)(2), 1673e(a).
34 Id. § 1675.
35 Id. § 1675(c).
36 Id. § 1516a.
7 Id. §§ 1516a(a)(1), (d); 28 U.S.C. § 2631(c) (1982).
38 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(1) (1982).
39 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1982).
40 Id. § 1295(a)(5).
41 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1982). This standard is essentially that found at 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1982). See Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1575 n.18.
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II. Federal Circuit Antidumping Duty Decisions
In three recent decisions, Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. v.
Silver Reed America, Inc. ;42 Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States;4 3
and Smith-Corona Group v. United States,44 the Federal Circuit reviewed
ITA interpretations of the antidumping duty statute. In all three
cases, the CAFC upheld the regulations against challenges that they
were not in accordance with law.45
In Smith-Corona Group Smith-Corona, the last remaining domes-
tic manufacturer of portable electric typewriters, 46 challenged an
ITA antidumping duty determination 4 7 in which several adjustments
made to the foreign market value of Japanese typewriters48 substan-
tially reduced estimated dumping margins. 49 Smith-Corona specifi-
cally challenged the validity of two regulations5° promulgated by the
Commerce Department under the authority of section 773(a)(4)(B)
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the TAA. 5 1 The first regu-
42 753 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
43 732 F.2d 924 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
44 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1274 (1984).
45 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1040; Melamine Chems., Inc., 732 F.2d at 935; Smith-
Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1582.
46 713 F.2d at 1570.
47 Id. at 1570-71.
48 Id. at 1573 n.12.
49 Id. at 1571 n.4. In the case of one Japanese typewriter manufacturer, the dumping
margin was reduced from 48.7% ad valorem to 5.31% ad valorem. For another Japanese
manufacturer, the margin was reduced from 36.53% ad valorem to 14.91% ad valorem.
Id.
Id. at 1574. Smith-Corona attacked 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) and (d). 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.15(a) and (b) (1985) sets forth specific classes of adjustments, such as advertising
and selling expenses, and provides criteria for determining the amount of allowances
under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B). 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) and (d) (1985) provides in part:
(c) Special rule. Notwithstanding the criteria for adjustments for differ-
ences in circumstances of sale set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this sec-
tion, reasonable allowances for other selling expenses generally will be made
in cases where a reasonable allowance is made for commissions in one of the
markets under consideration and no commission is paid in the other market
under consideration, the amount of such allowance being limited to the ac-
tual other selling expenses incurred in the one market, or the total amount of
the commission allowed in such other market, whichever is less. In making
comparisons using exporter's sales price, reasonable allowance will be made
for all actual selling expenses incurred in the home market up to the amount
of the selling expenses incurred in the United States market.
(d) Determination of allowances. In determining the amount of the rea-
sonable allowances for any differences in circumstances of sale, the Secretary
will be guided primarily by the cost of such differences to the seller, but,
where appropriate, he may also consider the effect of such differences upon
the market value of the merchandise.
Id. In addition to its challenge to the regulations, Smith-Corona attacked the validity of
the amounts of three specific adjustments to foreign market value granted the Japanese
manufacturers. See 713 F.2d at 1574-75.
51 713 F.2d at 1574. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1982) provides:
(4) Other adjustments
In determining foreign market value, if it is established to the satisfac-
tion of the administering authority that the amount of any difference between
the United States price and the foreign market value (or that the fact that the
19861
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lation permitted differences in circumstances of sale to be computed
on the basis of cost.5 2 Smith-Corona argued that the regulation's
preference for cost, rather than price or value, was inconsistent with
the Act. 53 The second regulation challenged by Smith-Corona es-
tablished an "exporter's sales price offset" (ESP),54 which permitted
"reasonable allowances" for all actual selling expenses incurred in
the home market up to the amount of comparable selling expenses
incurred in the United States market.55 Because this rule effectively
raised the U.S. price for imported typewriters, it substantially re-
duced dumping margins.56 Smith-Corona contended that no statu-
tory support for such an adjustment existed,57 and that this
regulatory adjustment was entirely inconsistent with the adjustments
the TAA expressly permitted. 58
In addressing Smith-Corona's arguments, the Federal Circuit
stated that the contested regulations must satisfy two criteria to be
sustained. First, they must be a proper exercise of the Secretary's
authority.59 Second, they must be reasonable. 60 The court elabo-
rated that the reasonableness of the regulations would be deter-
mined by statutory language, legislative history, and legislative
purpose.61
With this analytical backdrop as a guide, the court reviewed
Smith-Corona's cost-based criterion argument. 62 The court first
considered whether the regulations were a proper exercise of agency
authority. Although the CAFC found that the regulation lacked con-
gressional acquiescence 63 and was not entitled to deferential re-
view,64 the court concluded the ITA's broad discretionary authority
permitted it to issue the regulation. 65 In addition, the CAFC held
United States price is the same as the foreign market value) is wholly or
partly due to-
(B) other differences in circumstances of sale....
then due allowance shall be made therefor.
Id.
52 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(d) (1985); see supra note 50.
53 713 F.2d at 1574.
54 Id.
55 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1985); see supra note 50.
56 713 F.2d at 1571 n.4.
57 Id. at 1574, 1577.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1575.
60 d.
61 Id.
62 Id. The court found that neither the TAA's legislative history nor its purpose were
illuminating. See id at 1576.
63 Id.
64 The court rejected the Government's argument that heightened deference was
necessary because the regulation was longstanding. Id.
65 Id. at 1577.
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that the regulation was not promulgated ultra vires because "the stat-
ute does not explicitly forbid reliance on cost."16 6 Paradoxically, the
court acknowledged that Congress has recognized the "inherent un-
reliability" of cost criteria, but nonetheless upheld the regulation.6 7
Although the Federal Circuit found no support for the regula-
tion in the TAA's legislative history, it concluded that the regulation
was reasonable. Because of the stringent statutory deadlines within
which AD investigations and determinations must be completed, the
court reasoned that cost data may be the only readily available, relia-
ble indicia of value, and sustained the regulation. 68
In analyzing the ESP offset, the Federal Circuit first considered
the Government's contention that this offset was designed to redress
a "perceived unfairness" in the calculation of foreign market value. 69
The Act provides that specific adjustments may be made to the ex-
porter's sales price of merchandise 70-the "United States price" in
related purchaser import transactions-including downward adjust-
ment for certain "indirect costs," such as selling expenses.71 The
ITA argued that the ESP offset regulation was necessary to counter-
balance the indirect selling cost adjustment for U.S. concerns be-
cause comparable downward adjustments were not permitted for
foreign market indirect costs. 72 Smith-Corona countered that the
ESP offset rendered section 772(e)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 void 73
because it permitted two different foreign market value computa-
66 Id. As an example, the CAFC noted that pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(3) con-
structed value based on cost criteria may be used to determine foreign market value when
home market price or third country price are not available. Id. at 1575-76 & n.20. The
TAA states a preference for the use of home market price over third country price. 19
U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(l)-(2) (1982). The legislative history of the Act shows a preference for
the use of third country price over constructed value. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 4, at 96
("third country prices will normally be preferred over constructed value if presented in a
timely manner and if adequate to establish foreign market value.") Id. Commerce Depart-
ment regulations likewise reflect this preference for the use of third country prices. 19
C.F.R. § 353.4(b) (1985). See Hemmendinger & Barringer, The Defense of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Investigations Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.CJ. INT'L L. &
CoM. REG. 427, 432-33 (1981).
67 The court remarked: "Dumping is a prime example of unfair competition in which
a foreign manufacturer ignores the normal relationship of cost to price. Hence, cost is
subject to manipulation and Congress has recognized its inherent unreliability." 713 F.2d
at 1576. (emphasis added).
68 713 F.2d at 1577 & n.27.
69 Id. at 1577. The ESP offset allows for adjustments to foreign market value which in
turn reduce the dumping margin. Id.
70 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d)-(e) (1982). These adjustments include additions to ex-
porter's sales price (e.g., costs of containers and packing, rebated duties by the country of
exportation) and subtractions from that price (e.g., export taxes or duties). Id. § 1677a(d).
Indirect costs, such as selling expenses, may also be subtracted from the exporter's sales
price. Id. I 1677a(e). See Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1577-78.
7' 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(e)(2) (1982).
72 Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1578. As a consequence, the ITA promulgated 19
C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1985). This regulation permits a comparable adjustment to foreign
market value for selling expenses incurred in the home market. See supra note 50.
73 Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1577.
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tions and two different fair value comparisons to be used when the
TAA only permits the use of one fair value. 74
The Federal Circuit sustained the regulation, accepting the
ITA's argument that the ESP offset was necessary to prevent the
higher dumping margins that would otherwise result from the calcu-
lation of foreign market value in some situations. 75 The CAFC
found little guidance in the legislative history to support the ESP off-
set,7 6 and was forced to retreat to language of the statute itself.77
The court refused to accept Smith-Corona's contentions because the
statute did not expressly foreclose the use of two different U.S. price-
foreign market value comparisons.78 The CAFC conceded that the
regulation negated the specific statutory adjustment to exporter's
sales price concerning selling expenses, 79 but rationalized the
agency's repeal of this statute by observing that the broader statutory
purpose of constructing fair comparisons was realized.80 Again de-
ferring to agency discretion, the court concluded that the ESP offset
was a proper and reasonable exercise of the agency's authority.8 '
Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp.82 provides a sequel to
Smith-Corona Group. In Smith-Corona the CAFC approved the ITA's
ESP offset, which allowed deduction of indirect costs from foreign
market value.83 In Consumer Products the court considered the validity
of the regulatory cap, denominated the "ESP offset cap," which the
ITA had placed on cost deductions.8 4 The ESP offset cap set a nu-
merical ceiling on these deductions equal to the amount of indirect
costs deducted from the U.S. price side of the equation. 5
Silver Seiko, a Japanese manufacturer of imported typewriters,
74 Id. at 1578; 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). Smith-Corona also argued that the an-
tidumping duty statute establishes the fair value comparison on an "f.o.b. foreign port"
price basis. 713 F.2d at 1578; see 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1982). According to Smith-Corona
the ITA's regulation distorted this result. 713 F.2d at 1578.
75 713 F.2d at 1578. The court reasoned that because certain downward adjustments
could be made in calculating exporter's sales price, but comparable downward adjust-
ments could not be made in calculating "purchase price," an anomaly would result-
higher dumping margins in the case of ESP transactions as compared to purchase price
transactions. Consequently, the CAFC concluded that the ESP offset was created to
smooth out this statutory rough spot. Id.
76 Id. at 1578-79.
77 Id. at 1579. "The statutory language.., is the only compelling evidence of record
regarding the validity of the offset." Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. "The offset does permit negation of one specific statutory adjustment to ex-
porter's sales price .... " Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1033.
83 See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
84 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1035-36.
85 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1985). See Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1035-36. The
sole question presented for the Federal Circuit's review was the validity of this regulatory
cap. Id. at 1037.
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challenged this regulation, arguing that section 773(a)(4)(B) of the
1930 Tariff Act, as amended,86 required deduction of all selling ex-
penses, both direct and indirect, from foreign market value.8 7 Be-
cause the ESP offset cap limited foreign market selling expense
deductions, Silver Seiko contended the fundamental goal of the AD
law, a fair comparison of prices in U.S. and Japanese markets, was
frustrated.88
The Federal Circuit refused to adopt Silver Seiko's position,
pointing out that Congress ratified the long-standing administrative
practice of limiting deductions for differences in circumstances of
sale to direct expenses such as credit terms, warranties, and differ-
ences in the level of trade, in the statute's legislative history.89 Con-
sequently, the court concluded that the ITA could not be required to
make foreign market value adjustments attributable to indirect sell-
ing expenses.90
After determining that the offset cap was consistent with the
statute, the CAFC considered whether the regulation establishing
the ESP offset cap was "a reasonable exercise of the Secretary's dis-
cretion."9 1 The court determined that the agency's construction of
the statute was entitled to great weight because it was charged with
administering the statute.92 The court added that the ITA's inter-
pretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpreta-
tion, but must be upheld if it has a reasonable basis in the statutory
history.93 The Federal Circuit found that limiting the foreign market
8 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4)(B) (1982).
87 Id.
88 753 F.2d at 1037. Silver Seiko based its argument that the statute requires deduc-
tion of all expenses of sale, direct as well as indirect, from foreign market value on the
language of § 773(a)(4)(B).
89 Id. at 1038. The court noted only one exception to this rule: when exporter's sales
price was used as the U.S. price, indirect expenses were allowed to be deducted as well. Id.
90 Id.
91 See id. at 1038-39.
92 The court noted the following:
As this court recently stated in Melamine Chemicah, Inc. v. United States,
732 F.2d 924, 928 (Fed. Cir. 1984):
When the issue is the validity of a regulation issued under a statute
an agency is charged with administering, it is well established that the
agency's construction of the statute is entitled to great weight.... Simi-
larly, agency regulations are to be sustained unless unreasonable and
plainly inconsistent with the statute, and are to be held valid unless
weighty reasons require otherwise.
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted).
The court added that in determining whether a regulation is reasonable, considerable
deference is to be accorded agency expertise, "the masters of the subject." Id. (quoting
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979)).
93 The court stated:
Further, it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's interpretation of
the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one which
the court views as the most reasonable. See, e.g., Fulman v. United States, 434
U.S. 528, 534-36 . . . (1978) (regulation which had a "reasonable basis" in
1986]
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value adjustment for indirect selling expenses to the amount of such
expenses in the United States was not arbitrary.94 It reasoned that
"any greater allowance could distort the computations in favor of
foreign manufacturers" 9 5 and the cap permitted a more efficient and
expedited administrative process by shortening the investigation. 6
The Commerce Department, the court suggested, need only be con-
vinced that "valid" expenses meet or exceed the level of the cap.9 7
Therefore, the CAFC concluded the regulation must be upheld be-
cause it was reasonable "[u]nder the limited standard of judicial re-
view applicable to this case."P
9 8
A third case, Melamine Chemicals, Inc. v. United States,99 concerned
the ITA's method of using currency exchange rates to calculate
dumping margins.10° Melamine Chemicals challenged the ITA's
practice of using exchange rates from the quarter preceding an an-
tidumping duty investigation,"1 arguing that 31 U.S.C. section
372102 requires use of exchange rates for the quarter in which the
merchandise was exported.103
The ITA's rationale for using the prior quarter's exchange rates
was that, because the entire period under investigation was marked
by significant exchange rate fluctuations, an exporter pricing its
goods could not possibly predict the volatile exchange rate fluctua-
tions occuring within that quarter" °4 The ITA contended that fair-
ness to the hapless exporter dictated use of exchange rates
applicable to the quarter in which the export sale occurred to deter-
mine whether a dumping margin existed. 10 5 The ITA -preliminarily
found a 2.18 percent dumping margin.10 6 It then applied the ex-
change rates in effect for the quarter in which the exporter set its
prices, that being the quarter preceding the quarter in which the sale
for exportation was made, to provide "a reasonable period of time to
the statutory history upheld, even though taxpayer's challenge had "logical
force").
Id.
94 Id. at 1040.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 732 F.2d at 924.
100 Id. at 925. See Comment, Antidumping-Appication of Preceding Quarter's Foreign Ex-
change Rates to Fair Value Determination, 20 TEx. INT'L LJ. 425 (1985).
101 732 F.2d at 925.
102 This statute is now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5151 (1982).
103 732 F.2d at 925-26.
104 Id. at 931-32. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.56(b) (1985); Amendment of Final Determina-
tion, 45 Fed. Reg. 29,619, 29,620 (1980).
105 732 F.2d at 933. The applicable quarter for export sales is determined by 31
U.S.C. § 5151 (1982).
106 Id.
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take into account" the exchange rate fluctuation. 10 7 Using this
methodology, no dumping margin existed because the initial 2.18
percent margin was solely attributable to a volatile exchange rate.'08
The CAFC applied the guidelines it used in its Smith-Corona
Group and Consumer Products Division decisions to analyze the ITA's
regulation. 09 First, the court noted that because the issue before it
was the validity of a regulation issued pursuant to a statute which an
agency administered, the agency's interpretation of the statute was
entitled to great weight.I10 Second, the court held that such a regu-
lation must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsis-
tent with the enabling statute."'I The CAFC acknowledged that no
express authority for the ITA's "90-day lag" rule existed. It found,
however, that "Commerce's duty to enforce fairly the antidumping
laws by determining whether LTFV [less-than-fair-value] sales are or
are not occurring" constituted implicit authority and that "[a] finding
of LTFV sales based on a margin resulting solely from a factor beyond
the control of the exporter would be unreal, unreasonable, and un-
fair." ' 12 In analyzing the 90-day lag rule, the court deferred entirely
to the agency, deeming itself an "inappropriate institution . . . to
determine whether a 'reasonable period' would entail a lag of
45 days, or 60 days, or 90 days." '" s The Federal Circuit deemed it
sufficient that the ITA determined that the 90-day lag rule was rea-
sonable because there was no showing that the rule was
unreasonable. 114
I. Judicial Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretation
The courts have frequently pronounced that interpretations of
statutes that agencies are charged with administering are entitled to
great deference. 1 5 The Supreme Court has endorsed this position,
stating that to sustain an agency's interpretation of a statute, a court
need not find an agency's interpretation to be the only reasonable
one, nor need its interpretation be the result which the court itself
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 928.
110 Id.
I I I Id. The court also noted the" 'tremendous deference to the expertise of... Com-
merce in administering the antidumping law.'" Id. at 930 (quoting Smith-Corona Group,
713 F.2d at 1582).
112 Id. at 933 (emphasis in original).
11S Id.
114 Id.
i 15 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982) ("Although not determi-
native, the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to
great deference, particularly when that interpretation has been followed consistently over
a long period of time."); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 451 (1978);
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); 5 K. DAvis, ADMINISntATVE LAw TREATISE § 29.16, at
400 (1978).
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would have reached had the question first been presented in a judi-
cial proceeding.' "6 According to the Court, all that a reviewing court
must find is that the agency's interpretation be "sufficiently reason-
able" to be accepted." 17
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council provides
one of the more recent and most exhaustive treatments of this ques-
tion by the Supreme Court.118 In Chevron the Court applied a two-
step analysis.119 The first inquiry is whether Congress has directly
addressed the precise question at issue.' 20 If it has, the regulation
stands.' 2 ' If, however, a court determines that Congress has not di-
rectly addressed the question, a second inquiry, whether the agency's
regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute, is
necessary. 122 In making this determination, the Court added that an
agency's construction of a statute it administers deserves controlling
weight.' 23 The Court elaborated that two situations warrant further
judicial deference. First, deference is heightened if a "full under-
standing of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation...
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the mat-
ters subject to agency regulations."' 24 Second, deference is height-
ened if the agency's interpretation involves issues of considerable
public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any mis-
perception of its statutory objectives. 125
Despite the substantial deference that the Supreme Court has
established for agency interpretations of statutes, it has qualified its
rather sweeping statements with the caveat that the agency's con-
struction is "not determinative."'126  Although the shibboleth of
"agency expertise" has been often invoked to bolster an agency's in-
terpretation of statutes, the Court has warned that so-called "expert
116 See, e.g., Zenith Radio, 437 U.S. at 450.
117 Id.; Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976).
118 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
119 Id. at 2781 ("When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions.") IL See R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P.
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATI LAW AND PROCESS § 7.7, at 405-07 (1985) [hereinafter cited as
PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL].
120 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82. "First, always, is the question whether Congress had di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress." Id. (footnote omitted).
121 Id. at 2782 n.9.
122 Id. at 2782. "[11f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Id. (footnote omitted).
123 Id. at 2782.
124 1d See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 382 (1980); United States v. Rutherford,
442 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1978).
125 104 S. Ct. at 2782-83.
126 Clark, 454 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2869 (1983); 5 K. DAvis, supra note 115,
§ 29.16, at 399.
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discretion" has its limits: "Expert discretion is the lifeblood of the
administrative process, but unless we make the requirements for ad-
ministrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of
modem government, can become a monster which rules with no
practical limits on its discretion."'127 Nonetheless, it would probably
be an error to conclude that these quotations are "the law."' 28 The
Supreme Court has vacillated in its deferential stance towards agency
expertise. As Professor Kenneth Culp Davis aptly observes: "The
accurate statement is that such quotations are sometimes the law and
sometimes not. In each case, the Supreme Court has discretion to
adopt or to reject the quotations, and the choice it makes usually
depends on which way it wants to resolve the substantive
question."129
Matters are also complicated, in Davis' view, by the fact that def-
erence to an agency's interpretation of law is not generally men-
tioned in Supreme Court opinions which reject agency
interpretations.13 0 Although Davis suggests that " '[d]eference' ...
[is] useful when the Court is in doubt about the interpretation but is
satisfied to let the agency's decision stand," 13' he concludes that the
Court substitutes its own judgment for agency judgment more fre-
quently than it defers, even in cases when "the question of interpre-
tation involves policymaking within the agency's specialized
area."
13 2
Matters are further complicated because several areas of admin-
istrative regulation have developed their own specialized body of de-
cisional authority regarding judicial deference. 13s  As one
commentator noted, "the intensity and character of judicial review
will vary from one field to the next, depending on the court's percep-
tions about the specific legislative mandate, the makeup of the
agency, [and] the nature of the challenged program.' i3 4
Given the vagaries of judicial review in the administrative con-
text, a cynic would conclude that judges are result oriented, deciding
127 Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962) (quoting New
York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
128 5 K. DAvis, supra note 115, § 29.16, at 403. See PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, SUpra
note 119, at §§ 7.4, 7.6, 7.8.
129 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 115, § 29.16, at 403.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Levin, Federal Scope.of-Review Standards: A Preliminary Restatement, 37 AD. L. REv. 95,
97 (1985) "[E]very substantive field of regulation develops its own body of case law articu-
lating the degree of deference to be afforded to various administrative determinations in
that area." Id. at 97. Se, e.g., Boudreau, To Defer or Not To Defer: The Question for the D.C
Circuit in Reuing FCC Deasions, 36 FED. CoM. LJ. 293 (1984) (using the FCC as an exam-
ple of administrative regulation and review of agency decisionmaking). See genera//y
Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. Prrr. L
REv. 587 (1984).
134 Levin, supra note 133, at 97.
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cases primarily on their individual policy predilections. Cynics
notwithstanding, however, "[t]he deference owed to an expert tribu-
nal cannot be allowed to slip into a judicial inertia."' 3 5 Judges un-
questionably take their roles seriously. This is not to deny that
judges enter the arena carrying their own set of political and ideolog-
ical baggage. While their review may be highly subjective, courts still
possess legitimate independence when reviewing agency statutory
interpretations.'1 6 The Supreme Court has endorsed this independ-
ent judgment principle: "When an agency's decision is premised on
its understanding of a specific congressional intent... it engages in
the quintessential judicial function of deciding what a statute means.
In that case, the agency's interpretation may be influential, but it
cannot bind a court."' 3 7
How does section 516A of the Act' 3 8 measure up against this
analytical framework? This question is addressed in the following
part of this article.
IV. Judicial Review Under the TAA
In the author's view, the scope ofjudicial review provided in sec-
tion 516A(a)(2)13 9 is so vague as to be devoid of any meaningful
standards. The statute's proviso that an agency's decision must be
upheld unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, or is other-
wise not in accordance with law,' 40 tells reviewing courts nothing of
the process to be followed; it merely states conclusions.
Although the scope of review standards in section 516A(a)(2)
may be inadequate, increasing the intensity of review might yield a
more meaningful judicial review process.' 4 ' Three levels of intensity
of review have been identified.1 42 The first has been termed a "kid
135 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261,
271 (1968).
136 As noted by Justice Frankfurter in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951):
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for
certitude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial
discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual
process of judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile
casuistry.
Id. at 488-89.
137 BATF v. FLRA, 104 S. Ct. 439, 445 n.8 (1983). See SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103,
118 (1978) (the courts are "final authorities on issues of statutory construction").
138 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1982). See Note, supra note 10.
'39 19 U.S.C. § 1561a(a)(2) (1982).
140 Id.
141 See Comment, Administrative Law-Judicial Review of Agenty Action: Motor Vehicle Man-
ufacturers Association v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 884,
898 (1984).
142 Pierce & Shapiro, Political andJudicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1175,
1186-91 (1981).
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gloves" approach. 145 As the name implies, this standard is highly
deferential to agency action. 144 A second, more intense level of re-
view is the "adequate consideration" test. 145 Under this test, a court
will invalidate an agency's action when it fails to follow or fully con-
sider factors and goals set out in the enabling legislation.' 46 The
third and most intensive level of judicial scrutiny is the "hard look"
test.' 47 Under this test, the court's review is more probing and the
degree of deference is at its lowest. ' 48 Judges most often employ the
"hard look" test when the agency's action appears inconsistent with
its statutory mandate.' 49 In addition, this test may be employed
when the issue before the reviewing court is of great public impor-
tance.' 50 As the following discussion demonstrates, little justifica-
tion exists for any but the lowest degree ofjudicial deference in cases
involving Federal Circuit review of ITA interpretations of the an-
tidumping duty law.151
The judicially vigilant "hard look" test is the most appropriate
standard for Federal Circuit review of ITA antidumping law determi-
nations for two reasons. First, Congress referred repeatedly to the
"specialized expertise" of the Court of International Trade and the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the 1980 Customs Courts
Act's legislative history. 152 This judicial expertise extends to all civil
actions arising from import transactions. 153 Given Congress' explicit
acknowledgement of the CAFC's special expertise in international
trade matters, it is questionable whether the CAFC should ever defer
143 Id. at 1188-89; Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061, 1072 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom California Co. v. FPC, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
14 Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 142, at 1188-89.
145 Id. at 1190-91.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1187-88.
148 Id. This level of review has been described as review "with vigilance." Greater
Boston Television Co. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
923 (1971).
149 Pierce & Shapiro, supra note 142, at 1187-88 & n.76.
150 Id. at 1188 n.76.
151 As commentators have pointed out, no matter how much deference is shown, a
court never actually affirms an agency interpretation of a statutory provision without first
independently analyzing it and its legislative history. If the court finds a conflict, it
reverses under any standard of review. Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference: Judicial
Review of Agenty Action, 31 AD. L. REv. 329, 332-35 (1979); PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL,
supra note 119, at 376-77.
152 H.R. REP. No. 1235, supra note 5, at 20. "The Customs Courts Act of 1980 creates
a comprehensive system ofjudicial review of civil actions arising from import transactions,
utilizing the specialized expertise of the United States Customs Court [the predecessor
court of the Court of International Trade] and the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals [one of the two courts which were merged to form the CAFC]." Id. The
House Report also referred to the major goals of the Customs Courts Act, one of which
was "[t]he re-emphasis and clarification of Congress' intent that the expertise [of the CIT
and CAFC] be exclusively utilized in the resolution of conflicts and disputes arising out of
the tariff and international trade laws ..... Id. at 28.
153 Id. at 20.
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to the ITA in cases involving statutory construction of the antidump-
ing duty law. While the Federal Circuit has referred to the ITA as
the "master" of the AD law' 54 and has deferred to the agency on that
basis,155 this deference is arguably an instance of the tail wagging the
dog because of the role the Federal Circuit has been assigned by the
Customs Courts Act. Second, the "hard look" test should be em-
ployed because every AD determination reached by the ITA touches
upon a question of public importance to international trade involv-
ing the world's largest economic power.' 56
V. CAFC Deference to the ITA
In Smith-Corona Group the Federal Circuit had before it a paradig-
matic case of an agency interpreting the statute which it was en-
trusted with administering.1'5 7 The case did not involve any fact
findings or other evidentiary matters which informed the ITA's inter-
pretation of the statute.' 58 The CAFC applied a two-step inquiry:
"whether the regulations are a proper exercise of the [Commerce]
Secretary's authority and [whether the regulations] are reason-
able."1 59 It steered clear of the "hard look" test, applying instead a
standard of review more akin to the "adequate consideration"
test.' 60 The CAFC should have applied the "hard look" test em-
ployed by reviewing courts when the issue is either technical or of
critical importance, or when the agency's action appears inconsistent
with its statutory mandate.' 6 ' International trade issues meet these
two criteria,' 62 and the CAFC is as well positioned as the ITA to
interpret the TAA because of its specialized expertise in interna-
tional trade matters, 163 and given the exclusivity of its appellate ju-
risdiction over TAA cases. 64
The court conceded that the ITA's interpretation of the TAA
was somewhat inconsistent with the Act and its legislative history, 165
noting that Congress had expressed dissatisfaction with the use of
15 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1039.
155 Id. at 103940.
156 As stated by the court in this connection in Smith-Corona Group: "The number of
factors involved, complicated by the difficulty in quantification of these factors and the
foreign policy repercussions of a dumping determination, makes the enforcement of the
antidumping law a difficult and supremely delicate endeavor." 713 F.2d at 1571.
157 Id. at 1575.
158 See id at 1575-77.
159 Id. at 1575. The court also relied upon the Administrative Procedures Act, 5
U.S.C. § 706 (1982), and the Supreme Court's opinion in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United
States, 437 U.S. 443, 450.51 (1978). Id. at 1575 n.18.
160 713 F.2d at 1575. See supra notes 14148 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
162 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
163 See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
164 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1982).
165 713 F.2d at 1575-76.
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cost, as opposed to value and price, in determining foreign market
value.' 6 The CAFC nevertheless upheld the ITA's regulation em-
ploying cost criteria to compute allowances for differences in circum-
stances of sale.167 The court also conceded that the ESP offset was
"inconsistent with the general [statutory] requirement of a direct re-
lation"' 68 between circumstances of sale and the transaction under
investigation, noting that the statute repeatedly refers to "foreign
market value, as if there were only one foreign market value under
consideration."'16 9 The court nonetheless sanctioned the ITA's use
of criteria that negated the express adjustment to exporters' sales
price authorized by the TAA.' 70
Had the "hard look" test been employed in this case, the CAFC
should not have upheld either regulation. Because the statute and
legislative history clearly reject the use of cost criteria in determining
differences in circumstances of sale, 17' the court should have invali-
dated this regulation under a "hard look" test. The ESP offset,
which the ITA clearly fashioned out of whole cloth in contravention
of the Act, should also have been invalidated. The TAA does not
authorize use of two different foreign market value computations de-
pending on whether U.S. price was based on purchase price or ex-
porter's sales price. 172 To the contrary, Congress expressly
provided that adjustments to foreign market value be based solely on
direct costs. 7s Because the ESP offset' 74 flouts this explicit congres-
sional directive by allowing an offset to foreign market value based
on indirect costs or expenses,' 75 the ITA's regulation would have
been unacceptable under the close scrutiny of "hard look" analysis.
In Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. the court held that the
166 Id. at 1576.
167 Id. at 1577.
168 Id. at 1578.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1579. The court stated:
Although the statute expressly requires a direct relationship between the dif-
ferences in circumstances of sale and adjustments to foreign market value,
we cannot conclude that the administering authority acted either beyond its
authority or unreasonably in promulgating the offset. The offset does permit
negation of one specific statutory adjustment to exporter's sales price, but
does so to achieve a broader statutory purpose otherwise frustrated because
of the alternative statutory methods of computing United States price.
Id.
171 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677a, 1677b(a)(4) (1982); S. REP. No. 249, supra note 4, at
60, 93-96. To the contrary, the Act and its legislative history indicate that price or value
criteria should be used. Id.; Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1577.
172 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1677b (1982).
17s Id. § 1677b(a)(4).
174 See 19 C.F.R. § 353.15(c) (1985). See Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1578.
175 See H.R. REp. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1979). "[Tlhe Committee intends
that adjustments [to foreign market value] should be permitted if they are reasonably iden-
tifiable, quantifiable, and directly related to the sales under consideration...".Id. (empha-
sis added).
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ESP offset cap was a reasonable exercise of the Secretary's discre-
tion,176 exhibiting its deference to agency expertise with such
phrases as "great weight"'177 and "considerable deference"'178 to the
" 'masters of the subject.' 179 In the most cursory of analyses, the
CAFC held that limiting the adjustment for indirect selling expenses
on the Japanese foreign market value side of the antidumping duty
equation to the amount allowed against the exporter's sales price,
the U.S. price, was not arbitrary. The court stated that "any greater
allowance could distort the computations in favor of foreign manu-
facturers."' 80 The court justified validating the ESP offset cap be-
cause it aided in efficient administration of the law.18' The cap
achieved this result by freeing the agency from the task of calculating
and investigating indirect expenses on the foreign market side of the
ledger as soon as those expenses equalled comparable expenses on
the U.S. price side of the ledger.
While administrative efficiency may be promoted under the ESP
offset cap, rational agency action clearly is not. It makes no more
sense to place a ceiling on indirect selling expenses on the U.S. price
side of the equation than it does to place the ceiling on the foreign
market value side. Indeed, the ESP offset cap will skew the calcula-
tions in favor of higher dumping margins in cases in which indirect
expenses connected with foreign market value exceed the expenses
associated with U.S. price.
The analysis the CAFC employed in the preceding two cases is
virtually identical to that utilized in Melamine Chemicals, Inc. 182 The
CAFC stated that agency regulations must be sustained unless
"plainly inconsistent with the statute"' 83 or "weighty reasons re-
quire otherwise. s18 4 In upholding the 90-day lag rule, the Federal
Circuit emphasized the regulation's salutary purpose of enabling the
ITA to disregard temporary exchange rate fluctuations.185 While it
is difficult to quarrel with this goal, the source of ITA authority for
promulgating the regulation is unclear. The CAFC essentially im-
plied agency authority to issue the exchange rate regulation from the
176 Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at 1039.
177 Id. (quoting Melamine Chems., Inc., 732 F.2d at 928).
178 Id.
179 Id. (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477
(1979)). In addition, the court observed: "it is a cardinal principle that the Secretary's
interpretation of the statute need not be the only reasonable interpretation or the one
which the court views as the most reasonable." 753 F.2d at 1039 (emphasis in original).
180 Id. at 1040.
181 Id. "[T]he cap does aid in efficient administration and assists the agency in meet-
ing the exigencies of times and staff limitations." Id.
182 Compare Smith-Corona Group, 713 F.2d at 1575; and Consumer Prods. Div., 753 F.2d at
1036; with Melamine Chems., Inc., 732 F.2d at 928.
183 Melamine Cheas., Inc., 732 F.2d at 928.
184 Id.
185 Id.
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TAA's legislative history.' 8 6 The court's conclusion is highly sus-
pect. Although there are broad statements within the legislative his-
tory suggesting that the ITA should have some flexibility in
administering the law,' 8 7 there is absolutely no indication that Con-
gress knew of or acquiesced in this regulation when it enacted the
TAA. In spite of the absence of clear Congressional support for this
regulation, however, its appeal is undeniable. It is arguably a fair
solution to the problem of apparent price differences between na-
tional markets created by floating exchange rates and not by
dumping.
When Congress has not addressed a particular issue, it is incum-
bent upon an agency to discern as nearly as possible what Congress
would have done had it considered the problem.18 8 Under this latter
analysis, it is difficult to conclude that the CAFC was far off the mark
in upholding the exchange rate regulation. If the Federal Circuit is
to be faulted in Melamine Chemicals, Inc., it is for its lack of candor in
acknowledging that Congress simply had not addressed the issue.
Using this admission as the starting point for analysis, the adminis-
tering agency was certainly no better placed than the court to "flesh
out" the statute. Filling in the interstices-"fleshing out"-is
quintessentially, and ultimately, a judicial function.' 8 9
VI. The CAFC and Deference--Conclusion
In each of the three cases discussed in this article, the Federal
Circuit deferred too much to the ITA. In Smith-Corona Group and
Consumer Products Division, SCM Corp. Congress had enacted a statu-
tory provision covering the subject matter, supplemented by legisla-
tive history. In light of these Congressional guidelines, the
overriding importance of international trade, and the CAFC's exclu-
sive, specialized jurisdiction over antidumping duty appeals, the Fed-
eral Circuit should have closely scrutinized the ITA's
determinations, rather than deferring to the agency as the purported
"master" of the antidumping duty law.
In Melamine Chemicals, Inc. Congress was silent on the question of
exchange rates in fair value investigations. Nevertheless, it was the
CAFC's prerogative as the responsible reviewing court for all an-
tidumping duty appeals to fill in this gap.
186 Id. at 930-31.
187 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong.. 1st Sess. 59 (1979); S. REP. No. 249, supra
note 4, at 49, 96.
188 See, e.g., Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 445 F.2d at 739, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1013 (1971); District of Columbia v. Orleans, 406 F.2d 957, 958 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
189 FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 226 (1968); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. ICC,
686 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 602 F.2d 929, 934
(10th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); supra note 137.
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It must be stressed that the Federal Circuit is a special federal
court. No other appellate court hears antidumping duty appeals.
Given the CAFC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction, it can be fairly as-
sumed that the judges of the Federal Circuit have acquired a level of
expertise on a par with the ITA, at least when statutory construction
and interpretation are involved. Any claim of "agency expertise" as
a basis for heightening judicial deference to ITA statutory interpre-
tations should be viewed skeptically.
In the final analysis, and in fairness to the Federal Circuit, the
judiciary is called upon to "steer a course between the Scylla of un-
due deference and the Charybdis of too broad review."' 90 Neverthe-
less, while "U]udicial review is not to be exercised with the zeal of a
pedantic schoolmaster who grades papers for a single correct an-
swer," 191 neither is a court to be a judicial "rubber stamp."'192 The
Federal Circuit should take special notice of this admonition because
Congress has identified the court as possessing special expertise in
the field of international trade law.
190 Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases During 1983, 36 AD. L. REv. 91. 111 (1984).
191 Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 694 F.2d 378, 383 (5th Cir. 1982).
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2160 (1984).
192 United States v. Garner, 767 F.2d 104, 116 (5th Cir. 1985).
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